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Evaluative conditioning is best defined as an effect, that is, as a change in the valence of a stimulus
that results from pairing the stimulus with another stimulus. This definition has several advantages
that are made explicit in this paper. One of the advantages is that it clarifies that evaluative
conditioning can be due to multiple processes. Therefore, the conditions under which evaluative
conditioning is observed can depend on the processes that underlie a particular manifestation of
evaluative conditioning. This could explain why there are so many conflicting results about the
conditions under which evaluative conditioning can be found. Future research should adopt a
meta-conditional approach that focuses not only on whether a certain condition is crucial for
obtaining evaluative conditioning but should also examine when a certain condition is crucial.
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El condicionamiento evaluativo se define como un efecto, es decir, un cambio en la valencia de
un estímulo que resulta de emparejar ese estímulo con otro. Esta definición tiene varias ventajas
que se explicitan en este trabajo. Una de las ventajas es que aclara que el condicionamiento
evaluativo puede deberse a múltiples procesos. Las condiciones bajo las cuales se observa el
condicionamiento evaluativo dependen, concretamente, de los procesos que subyacen a cada
manifestación particular del mismo. Esto podría explicar por qué hay tantos resultados conflictivos
referidos a las condiciones bajo las cuales se puede encontrar el condicionamiento evaluativo.
La investigación futura debe adoptar un enfoque meta-condicional que no solo se centre en si
una condición determinada es crucial para obtener el condicionamiento evaluativo, sino que
examine también cuándo esa condición es crucial. 
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One of the most influential ideas in psychology is that
preferences are an important determinant of behavior (e.g.,
Allport, 1935; Martin & Levy, 1978). To give just a few
examples from daily life, people tend to seek the company
of persons they like and avoid being in the company of
persons they do not like; they buy products that they like
more often than those that they do not like; people vote for
the politicians that they find sympathetic but not those that
repel them; they will pay to do the things they like but need
to be paid to do the things that they dislike. Furthermore,
preferences influence attention, memory, and judgments,
and form the basis of our emotional life. In order to
understand, predict, and influence behavior, it is thus crucial
to understand how preferences are formed and can be
influenced. Evaluative conditioning is generally considered
to be one of the approaches to influence liking. Studies on
evaluative conditioning have shown that the liking of a
neutral stimulus can be changed by pairing it with another,
liked or disliked, stimulus. The first stimulus is often called
the conditioned stimulus or CS whereas the second stimulus
is often called the unconditioned stimulus or US. Typically,
a CS will become more positive when it has been paired
with a positive US than when it has been paired with a
negative US. Well known real-life examples of evaluative
conditioning are the “have-a-Coke-and-a-smile” ads of the
Coca-Cola Company. In these ads, the Coke brand name
(CS) is repeatedly presented together with images of smiling
people having fun (US). It is assumed that this will increase
the liking of the brand.
Evaluative conditioning has been examined in a large
number of studies (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens,
2001, for an extensive review, and De Houwer, Baeyens, &
Field, 2005, for an update). Nevertheless, our understanding
of the phenomenon is still very limited. There now is general
agreement about the fact that evaluative conditioning is a
genuine phenomenon (an agreement that has been reached
only recently; see De Houwer, Baeyens, et al., 2005). It also
seems safe to conclude that evaluative conditioning can be
found with various kinds of stimuli and procedures. At the
same time, genuine failures to find evaluative conditioning
suggest that certain boundary conditions need to be fulfilled
before evaluative conditioning can emerge (see De Houwer
et al., 2001, for a review). There is little else that evaluative
conditioning researchers agree about. For instance, whereas
some results suggest that the effect can be found even when
participants are not aware of the CS-US contingencies (e.g.,
Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Dickinson &
Brown, 2007), the results of other studies suggest that
evaluative conditioning does crucially depend on contingency
awareness (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt,
2007). Likewise, whereas some argue that evaluative
conditioning is unaffected by extinction (i.e., presentations
of the CS in isolation after the CS-US pairings; e.g.,
Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh, & Eelen, 1988; Diaz,
Ruis, & Baeyens, 2005), others have reported data showing
that extinction does affect evaluative conditioning (e.g.,
Lipp, Oughton, & LeLievre, 2003).
In the current paper, I present a conceptual and
theoretical analysis that clarifies why so little progress has
been made in the study of evaluative conditioning and how
this can be remedied in future research. I will first argue
that evaluative conditioning is best defined as an effect rather
than as a specific procedure or theoretical process. This
conceptual analysis has important theoretical implications.
When defined as an effect, it becomes clear that different
kinds of processes could produce evaluative conditioning
effects (also see De Houwer, Baeyens, et al., 2005). This
insight sheds new light on many contradictory findings that
have been reported in the literature. It also implies that future
research should not only test whether a certain condition is
crucial for obtaining evaluative conditioning but should also
examine when a certain condition is crucial.
A Conceptual Analysis
The Distinction between Procedure, Effect, and Theory
The starting point of the present analysis is the distinction
between procedure, effect, and theory (see Bolles, 1979;
Eelen, 1980). Before applying this distinction to the concept
“evaluative conditioning,” I will try to explain the distinction
and illustrate it with regard to the well known concept
“priming”. A procedure is simply an objective list of actions,
a set of guidelines about what to do. It specifies the manner
in and conditions under which stimuli are presented and
responses registered. For example, a priming procedure most
often involves: (a) presenting on each trial a prime stimulus
and a target stimulus that are either related (e.g., NURSE-
DOCTOR) or unrelated (e.g., WALL-DOCTOR) and (b)
registering how long participants need to respond to the
target. An effect, on the other hand, is the result of a
procedure. More specifically, it is an observation that is
attributed to a certain abstract, core feature of the procedure.
For instance, the observation in priming tasks that responses
to the target DOCTOR are fast when it is preceded by the
prime NURSE can be labeled a priming effect if this
observation is attributed to the relatedness of the prime and
target. The core feature “relatedness” is abstract in that it
applies to a range of stimuli under a variety of conditions.
An observation becomes an effect only when there is
evidence showing that the core element of the procedure is
responsible for the observation. In the case of a priming
effect, this implies comparing reaction times on trials with
related prime-target pairs to reaction times on trials with
equivalent prime-target pairs that are not related in the same
manner. In practice, using the term effect thus requires a
comparison of observations in situations that differ only
with regard to the core procedural element that is thought
to be crucial for the effect. Finally, the term theory can be
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understood in this context as referring to the theoretical
processes that are assumed to be responsible for an effect.
For example, priming effects are often attributed to activation
that spreads in a semantic network from the representation
of the prime to the representation of the target, thus
facilitating responses to the target. A theory therefore implies
not only that a certain observation is due to a core element
of a procedure (e.g., relatedness of prime an target), it also
makes assumptions about the processes by which the core
elements of the procedure lead to the observed behavior
(e.g., spreading of activation).
Because concepts can be used to refer to a procedure,
effect, or theoretical process, it is important to always make
explicit the manner in which a term is used. For instance,
saying that NURSE primes DOCTOR can mean that the
word NURSE is presented briefly before the word DOCTOR
(priming as a procedure), that the presentation of NURSE
speeds up responses to DOCTOR because the two words
are related (priming as an effect), or that NURSE speeds
up responses to the related word DOCTOR because
activation spreads from the representation of the concept
“nurse” to the representation of the concept “doctor”
(priming as a theoretical process). To avoid confusion, one
needs to clarify which of the three meanings is appropriate.
Applying the Distinction between Procedure, Effect,
and Theory to Evaluative Conditioning
Like the concept “priming,” the concept “evaluative
conditioning” can be used to refer to a procedure, an effect,
or a theoretical process. Let us return to the example of the
“have-a- Coke-and-a-smile” ads. To say that this is an
example of evaluative conditioning can mean several things.
First, it could imply that the marketeers behind the ad
campaign used a certain procedure that is in essence identical
to the procedure used in evaluative conditioning studies.
Both in the ads and in lab studies, stimuli (e.g., a brand
name and pictures of smiling people) are presented together
in a certain manner and it is assessed whether this leads to
changes in liking. In this sense, evaluative conditioning
simply refers to what a marketeer does. Second, saying that
the Coke ads provide an example of evaluative conditioning
can mean that the pairing of the brand name and the smiling
faces actually produces a change in the liking of the Coke
brand. Evaluative conditioning is now understood to be an
effect of (a core element of) the procedure rather than the
procedure itself. It refers to the effect of the ads, not to the
ads as such. More generally, evaluative conditioning as an
effect refers to an actual change in the liking of stimuli that
is due to the fact that stimuli were paired in a certain manner.
The third and final way in which the concept “evaluative
conditioning” can be used is in terms of a theoretical process.
Although rarely made explicit, many researchers regard
evaluative conditioning as an automatic, bottom-up, and
low-level process that involves the formation and updating
of associations between representations in memory. Saying
that the “have-a-coke- and-a-smile” ads are an example of
evaluative conditioning could thus mean that the pairing of
Coke and smiling faces lead to an increase in liking because
an association was automatically formed between the
representation of the brand Coke and the representation of
the positive smiling faces. In the following sections, I will
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each of the
three possible definitions.
Evaluative Conditioning as a Procedure
When labeling a certain procedure as evaluative
conditioning, a criterion is needed that can be used to decide
whether the specific procedure classifies as an evaluative
conditioning procedure. One option would be to restrict the
term “evaluative conditioning” to one specific procedure.
For instance, it could be reserved for the picture-picture
conditioning procedure that Levey and Martin (1975) used
when they introduced the term “evaluative conditioning.”
In that case, however, the term cannot be used to refer to
highly similar paradigms in which other types of stimuli
such as tastes are used as CSs and USs (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen,
Van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1990). Hence, such a use of
the term would fail to highlight the core similarity between
a variety of specific procedures as well as the core
differences with other types of procedures1. 
A second option is to use a set of core procedural
elements as the defining criterion. As noted above, core
elements of the procedure refer to abstract procedural
properties that apply to a range of stimuli under a range of
1 The fact that such an identification of a concept with concrete aspects of the procedure can take place is illustrated by the standard
use of the term “Simon task.” In a typical Simon task, participants are asked to press a left key or right key on the basis of the color of
stimuli that are presented on the left or right side of a screen (e.g., Craft & Simon, 1970). Responses are faster when the irrelevant spatial
position of the stimulus and the relevant position of the response match than when they mismatch. What few researchers realize is that
Simon tasks do not necessarily involve spatial information. For instance, De Houwer and Eelen (1998) introduced an affective Simon
task in which participants were to say GOOD to nouns and BAD to adjectives (or vice versa). Results showed that participants were
faster when the valence of response and the stimulus matched (e.g., say GOOD to SUNSHINE because it is a noun) than when this
differed (e.g., say GOOD to CANCER because it is a noun). Structurally, both spatial and affective Simon tasks involve the manipulation
of the match between an irrelevant stimulus feature and a relevant response feature (see De Houwer, 2003). They thus share the same
core procedure.
conditions. Hence, many specific procedures can share the
same core procedure (i.e., a set of defining core procedural
elements). The question is what core procedural elements
should be selected as defining for evaluative conditioning
procedures. For reasons of simplicity and coherence, I
suggest to select those core procedural elements that are
also used to define evaluative conditioning effects. Given
that evaluative conditioning effects can be described as
changes in liking that are due to the pairing of stimuli, an
evaluative conditioning procedure can be described as a
procedure in which stimuli are paired and it is examined
whether this changes the liking of those stimuli.
This definition of an evaluative conditioning procedure
provides an important heuristic tool in that it allows one to
see what a wide range of evaluative conditioning procedures
have in common and how they differ from other types of
procedures. First, all evaluative conditioning procedures
have in common that (a) stimuli are paired and (b) it is
examined whether this leads to changes in valence. Different
evaluative conditioning procedures can differ with regard
to the specific stimuli that are presented, the way in which
liking is measured, and the conditions under which these
stimuli are presented and liking is measured. Second,
evaluative conditioning procedures are a subclass of
Pavlovian conditioning procedures. As in other Pavlovian
conditioning procedures, stimuli are paired. Evaluative
conditioning procedures are unique in that they focus on
changes in valence rather than changes in other responses
(e.g., salivation, skin conductance). Third, evaluative
conditioning procedures are a subclass of all procedures that
focus on changes in valence. Evaluative conditioning
procedures differ from those other procedures in that stimuli
are paired rather than presented in a non-contingent manner
(i.e., on their own as in mere exposure procedures) or in
relation to a certain behavior (as in operant conditioning
procedures).
Evaluative Conditioning as an Effect
In terms of an effect, evaluative conditioning can be
defined as an observed change in liking that is due to the
pairing of stimuli. Like other effects, there is an observation
(i.e., a change in liking) that is attributed to a core element
of a procedure (i.e., the fact that stimuli were paired in a
certain manner). In the previous section, I pointed out that
defining evaluative conditioning as an effect provides a
criterion for classifying procedures. In this section, I will
discuss a number of other advantages of defining evaluative
conditioning as an effect.
Defining evaluative conditioning as an effect clarifies
the similarities and differences with other effects. Just as
defining evaluative conditioning procedures in terms of a
core procedure provides a heuristic for classifying
procedures, defining evaluative conditioning effects in terms
of a core procedure provides a heuristic for classifying
effects. First, all changes in liking that are due to the pairing
of stimuli can be regarded as evaluative conditioning effects.
This is regardless of the types of stimuli that are used, the
conditions under which these stimuli are presented, and the
way in which liking is measured. Second, evaluative
conditioning effects constitute a subclass of all Pavlovian
conditioning effects. Like all other Pavlovian conditioning
effects, evaluative conditioning effects concern changes in
the response to a stimulus that result from pairing this
stimulus with another stimulus. What is unique to evaluative
conditioning effects is that they concern changes in one
particular type of response to the stimuli, namely changes
in the liking of the stimuli. Third, evaluative conditioning
effects are a subclass of all observed changes in liking. A
change in liking can be called evaluative conditioning only
if it can be established that the change is due to pairing
stimuli. There are several other possible reasons for why
the liking of a stimulus could change. For instance, research
on the mere exposure effect has demonstrated that the
repeated non-contingent presentations of a stimulus (i.e.,
repeatedly presenting the stimulus on its own) can change
the liking of the stimulus (see Bornstein, 1989, for a review).
Liking can change also as the result of a procedure in which
a behavior is paired with an outcome. Assume, for instance,
that pressing a lever leads to food when a certain light is
present. The behavior “pressing a lever” could become more
positive because it is paired with the reward. Likewise, the
liking of the light could increase because it signals the
opportunity to receive a reward. These changes in liking are
not evaluative conditioning effects because the changes in
liking are not due to the pairing of stimuli. One could refer
to these changes as operant evaluative conditioning effects
because they result from a core procedure in which the
presence of stimuli depends on the behavior of the individual
(whereas in Pavlovian procedures, the presence of the stimuli
is independent of the behavior of the individual). In contrast
to mere exposure and evaluative conditioning effects, there
is very little research on operant evaluative conditioning
effects (see Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002, for an
exception). 
There are clear criteria for determining the presence of
evaluative conditioning effects. Defining evaluative
conditioning as an effect implies that a change in liking can
be classified as an evaluative conditioning effect once it is
demonstrated that it is due to the pairing of stimuli. This can
be done by including appropriate control conditions that
differ from the experimental condition only with regard to
the way stimuli are paired. In a within-subject design, for
instance, some CSs are paired with a positive US whereas
other CSs are paired with a negative US. If the liking of the
two sets of CSs differs after presenting the pairings, then
this difference can be called an evaluative conditioning effect
provided that the two sets of CSs are entirely equivalent
except for the USs with which they were paired. For instance,
the two sets of stimuli cannot differ in how often they have
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been presented or in how similar they are to the different
USs (see Field & Davey, 1999, for a discussion of a possible
confound). In a between-subjects design, some participants
receive paired presentations of the CSs and USs whereas
other participants receive unpaired presentations of the same
stimuli. If the first group of participants shows larger changes
in liking of the CSs than the second group, then the changes
in liking can be called an evaluative conditioning effect
provided that the groups differ only in how the stimuli were
paired (see De Houwer et al., 2001, for a discussion of
within-subjects and between-subjects controls).
One complication should be noted, however. Although
it is possible to implement appropriate controls in a
laboratory environment, outside of the laboratory, such
controls are often absent. For instance, when confronted
with someone who genuinely dislikes spiders, it is difficult
to be certain that this dislike results from the fact that spiders
have been paired with negative stimuli in the past. Other
sources of liking such as genetic factors could also have
been important (e.g., Poulton & Menzies, 2002). Likewise,
when a certain advertisement is found to increase the liking
of a brand, it is difficult to know whether this is due to the
repeated presentation of the brand or the fact that the brand
was repeatedly paired with positive stimuli in the
advertisement. In such cases, labeling the change in liking
as an evaluative conditioning effect is merely a hypothetical
causal attribution.
Defining evaluative conditioning as an effect helps to
organize research. The fact that a procedure can be classified
as an evaluative conditioning procedure does not mean that
it will actually generate an evaluative conditioning effect (i.e.,
that pairing stimuli will lead to changes in the liking of those
stimuli). Whether it does can depend on at least three aspects
of the procedure: (a) the manner in which stimuli are paired,
(b) the specific stimuli and measures, and (c) the enabling
conditions under which the stimuli are presented or liking is
measured. Virtually all research on evaluative conditioning
has examined the impact of at least one of these three aspects
of the procedure on evaluative conditioning effects. Each
aspect will now be discussed in more detail.
The first set of studies looks at how stimuli need to be
paired in order to result in a change in liking. These studies
try to come to a better understanding of the core procedure
that is necessary for obtaining changes in liking. They focus
on factors such as the impact of the order and timing of the
CS and US on a trial (e.g., forward vs. backward
conditioning), the number of CS-US pairings, the contiguity
between the CS and US, the strength of the statistical
contingency between the presence of the CS and US, changes
in the CS-US contingencies (e.g., extinction, US-postexposure,
CS-preexposure, US-preexposure, counterconditioning, US-
revaluation), whether a CS and US are paired directly or
indirectly (i.e., sensory preconditioning, higher-order
conditioning), whether information about the CS-US relation
is presented through experience, observation, or instruction2
(see Rachman, 1977), interactions between different
contingencies (e.g., blocking), and whether the degree of
contingency between the CS and US is signaled by another
stimulus (i.e., occasion setting) (see De Houwer et al., 2001,
for a review). All these factors deal with the abstract
procedural properties of how stimuli are paired. These
properties are abstract in that they can be implemented with
multiple stimuli in multiple ways.
The second set of studies focuses on the generality of
evaluative conditioning effects. They examine whether, given
a certain core procedure, changes in liking can be observed
with specific kinds of stimuli and measures. Evaluative
conditioning effects have been found with a range of stimuli
including pictures of faces, pictures of statues, flavors, tactile
stimuli, and biologically significant stimuli (see De Houwer
et al., 2001, for a review). Effects have also been observed
with a variety of measures of liking, including sorting stimuli
into piles of liked, disliked, and neutral stimuli, ratings on
a Likert scale, physiological indices that are thought to reflect
liking, and reaction time measures of liking (see De Houwer
et al., 2001, for a review)3. Hence, evaluative conditioning
(as an effect) appears to be a general phenomenon.
The third set of studies focuses not on the nature of the
core procedure, nor on the specific stimuli or measures that
are used to implement the core procedure, but on the abstract
enabling conditions that could modulate the effect of the
core procedure. Again, abstract means that the enabling
conditions can be implemented or manipulated in multiple
ways. Examples of enabling conditions are awareness of
the CS-US contingencies, the availability of time and
attentional resources, and the presence of goals. Most if not
2 Note that changes in liking as the result of verbal information about the relation between stimuli can also be regarded as evaluative
conditioning effects. Such effects can be submitted to the same experimental analysis as other evaluative conditioning effects. This raises
the interesting question of whether experienced pairings lead to other changes under other conditions than instructed pairings.
3 Because the core procedure of evaluative conditioning involves not only the pairing of stimuli but also measuring changes in liking,
one could argue that studies examining variations in how liking is measured belong to the first set of studies on the nature of the core
procedure. This is especially true when abstract features of the measure are manipulated (e.g., verbal vs. nonverbal, direct vs. indirect,
...) and when the objective of the studies is to better understand what it means to say that one is measuring (changes in) liking. However,
when the aim is merely to examine whether evaluative conditioning effects generalize over different types of specific measures, the
studies do belong to the second set of studies.
all of these enabling conditions fall under the umbrella of
the concepts automatic or non-automatic (see Moors & De
Houwer, 2006a, for a detailed discussion). The conditions
refer to whether and in what way basic psychological
functions such as awareness, attention, and motivation are
required to enable the impact of stimulus pairings on liking.
Note that the classification of research that is offered
here differs from the classification that De Houwer et al.
(2001) used in their review of the evaluative conditioning
literature. They made a distinction between, on the one hand,
studies on the generality of evaluative conditioning and, on
the other hand, studies on the functional characteristics of
evaluative conditioning. The section on generality included
studies with different kinds of stimuli (e.g., visual, tactile)
and different procedural parameters (e.g., order of CS and
US, number of pairing, the way in which CSs were assigned
to USs). The section on functional characteristics summarized
studies on extinction, contingency, awareness, occasion
setting, amongst others. It is not clear, however, what
distinguishes studies on generality from studies on functional
characteristics. Although they did not provide an explicit
definition, De Houwer et al. (2001, p. 854) implied that
“functional characteristics of evaluative conditioning” refer
to the conditions under which evaluative conditioning can
be observed. In this sense, research on the generality of the
effect can also be seen as research on the conditions under
which evaluative conditioning can be found. The
categorization that is proposed in the present paper does
provide a meaningful distinction between three types of
conditions: those related to the core procedure, those related
to the specific stimuli and measures, and those related to
enabling conditions. By providing a meaningful distinction
between different types of conditions, it also leads to the
interesting question of how these three types of conditions
interact. For instance, do conclusions about the core
procedure depend on the enabling conditions that are
present? As will be discussed later on this paper, such
interactions might well exist.
Defining evaluative conditioning as an effect allows one
to entertain multiple theoretical accounts. The final
advantage is probably the most important one. When
evaluative conditioning is defined as an effect, the observed
change in liking is related only to a core aspect of the
procedure, being the pairing of stimuli. There is no
commitment with regard to the processes that explain why
the pairing of stimuli leads to a change in liking. It could
be that stimulus pairings automatically lead to the formation
of associations in memory and that the changes in liking
result from these newly formed associations. However, this
is not necessarily the case. Other processes might equally
well be responsible for “translating” the input of stimulus
pairings into an output of changes in liking. All theoretical
options are open. This also implies that evaluative
conditioning as an effect does not depend on the validity of
a particular theoretical view on evaluative conditioning.
When evaluative conditioning is defined in terms of an
observation that is attributed to core procedure rather than
to a theoretical process, it becomes clear that the validity
of one particular theoretical process account has no bearing
on the validity or existence of evaluative conditioning as
an effect. As we will see in the next section, problems can
arise when evaluative conditioning is defined as a theoretical
process.
Evaluative Conditioning as a Theoretical Process
When defined as a theoretical process, the concept
“evaluative conditioning” implies not only that a change in
liking is attributed to the pairing of stimuli but also that the
change is due to certain theoretical processes. Evaluative
conditioning as a theoretical process therefore constitutes a
more restrictive use of the term than evaluative conditioning
as an effect. It entails that not all evaluative conditioning
effects (i.e., changes in liking that are due to the pairing of
stimuli) are “genuine” cases of evaluative conditioning.
“True” evaluative conditioning has occurred only when the
changes in liking were due to a certain process. As noted
above, many researchers assume that evaluative conditioning
depends on an automatic, bottom-up, and low-level process
that involves the formation and updating of associations
between representations in memory and that results in
automatically produced changes in liking (e.g., Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2006, p. 697; Walther, Nagengast, &
Trasselli, 2005, p. 191). In this section, I will argue that
defining evaluative conditioning as a theoretical process
carries at least two risks. First, it renders it difficult to
determine whether evaluative conditioning has occurred.
Second, it hinders theoretical research.
How to determine the presence of evaluative conditioning
as a theoretical process? Defining evaluative conditioning
as a theoretical process renders it difficult to determine
whether evaluative conditioning has occurred, that is, whether
an observed change in valence is due to a particular process
such as the automatic formation of associations in memory.
Psychological processes are theoretical constructs that cannot
be observed directly and do not necessarily have a reality
value. For instance, nobody has ever seen an association in
memory. It is simply a theoretical assumption that could
help understand and organize existing empirical facts (i.e.,
the heuristic function of theoretical concepts) and that could
help generate predictions about new empirical facts (i.e.,
the predictive function of theoretical concepts). It is tempting
to forget that associations in memory are merely theoretical
constructs because associations are superficially similar to
neural links between neurons in the brain. This similarity,
however, is misleading. One can observe dendrites
developing between neurons, but this is completely different
from the associations between mental representations that
are assumed to underlie conditioned changes in valence.
Neurons are not mental representations and neural dendrites
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are not associations through which one representation can
activate another representation. The similarity is purely
superficial or metaphorical.
Although a theoretical process cannot be observed
directly, it could be inferred indirectly. To the extent that a
process theory allows one to make unique predictions about
the conditions under which a phenomenon can be observed,
observing the phenomenon under those conditions can be
taken as evidence for the operation of the hypothetical
processes. For instance, because association formation is
assumed to be automatic, one can predict that evaluative
conditioning effects can be observed in the absence of
awareness of the CS-US contingencies. Hence, observing
an evaluative conditioning effect in the absence of
contingency awareness can be taken as evidence for
automatic association formation and thus be used to infer
that “real” evaluative conditioning has occurred. Although
feasible in principle, this approach has certain disadvantages
and limitations. First, it depends on the assumption that the
process account makes unique predictions. If a competing
account can also explain that effects can occur given certain
conditions, then the presence of the effect under those
conditions is no longer diagnostic for the underlying process.
This is particularly problematic because one cannot foresee
which theories will be developed in the future. Second, the
approach requires a lot of work. In order to decide whether
evaluative conditioning has occurred, one not only needs to
establish that the change in liking is due to the pairing of
stimuli (otherwise associations could not have formed), it
also needs to be demonstrated that certain conditions were
met (e.g., that participants were unaware of the CS-US
contingencies). Whereas the former requires only the
presence of adequate controls, the latter can prove difficult
(e.g., how to demonstrate that participants were entirely
contingency unaware; see Shanks & St. Johns, 1994). Third,
the approach works only for those effects that are observed
under a limited set of conditions (e.g., when participants
are unaware of the contingencies). It does not allow one to
classify effects that are observed under standard conditions
because the effects under those conditions could be due to
multiple processes.
In sum, when evaluative conditioning is defined as a
theoretical process, it becomes difficult to determine whether
evaluative conditioning has occurred and thus to study
evaluative conditioning. This is because it is impossible to
observe the crucial process directly and because there are
difficulties and limitations with assessing the presence of a
process indirectly.
Defining evaluative conditioning as a process hinders
theoretical research. When evaluative conditioning is defined
as changes in valence as the result of a particular process
such as the automatic formation of associations in memory,
there is little point in examining the processes underlying
evaluative conditioning simply because the definition already
specifies what the crucial processes are. Related to this,
entertaining (either implicitly or explicitly) a theoretical
definition of evaluative conditioning reduces the probability
that one will consider the possibility that other processes
can also underlie conditioned changes in stimulus valence.
Because of this, theoretical definitions of evaluative
conditioning effects are likely to slow down the development
of new theories.
Another problem arises when the process theory turns
out to be wrong. For instance, defining evaluative
conditioning as a change in valence due to automatic
association formation implies that changes in valence that
are not due to automatic association formation are not “real”
cases of evaluative conditioning. Therefore, if research would
raise doubts about the validity of the idea that associations
are automatically formed in memory, this would also raise
doubts about the existence of evaluative conditioning as
such. The possibility that automatic association formation
might once be abandoned as a useful theoretical idea is not
that far fetched. Calls to this end have already been made
(e.g., Lovibond, 2003). Moreover, if even renowned
theoretical principles such as Newton’s law of gravity have
been surpassed, it seems unlikely that a simple process
theory such as that of automatic association formation would
stand the test of time.
In the past, there have been cases in which interest in
an empirical phenomenon dwindled because a particular
theoretical view on that phenomenon was questioned. In
1974, for instance, Brewer published a highly influential
chapter entitled “There is no evidence for classical
conditioning in humans.” This conclusion was based on
evidence showing that the pairing of stimuli changes the
responses to these stimuli only when participants are aware
of the contingencies between the stimuli. Importantly, the
reported evidence did not question the empirical phenomenon
that pairing stimuli can lead to changes in responding to
those stimuli. The evidence did, however, question the
dominant theoretical view of the time according to which
classical conditioning is based on the automatic formation
of associations in memory. Because this theoretical approach
to classical conditioning was so dominant, the term “classical
conditioning” was often defined (implicitly or explicitly) in
terms of this one particular theoretical view. That is, many
researchers did (and still do) define “true” classical
conditioning as conditioned changes in behavior that are
due to the automatic formation of associations in memory.
This is why evidence against the dominant theoretical view
led to doubts about the existence of classical conditioning
effects in humans. As a result of Brewer’s chapter, many
researchers lost interest in the phenomenon of classical
conditioning. This was a very unfortunate evolution because
the evidence reviewed by Brewer did not change the fact
that human behavior can be influenced by pairing stimuli.
Classical conditioning as an empirical phenomenon remains
important regardless of the validity of one type of process
account of classical conditioning. In a similar way, evaluative
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conditioning as an empirical phenomenon remains important
regardless of the validity of one type of process account of
evaluative conditioning. For this reason, it is important not
to define evaluative conditioning in terms of a theoretical
process.
A Theoretical Analysis
The conceptual analysis that was presented above leads
to the conclusion that the concept “evaluative conditioning”
would best be defined as an effect rather than as a specific
procedure or theoretical process. Perhaps the main advantage
of defining evaluative conditioning as an effect is that it
allows for the possibility that more than one process can
underlie evaluative conditioning effects. In this section, I
will first discuss two possible processes that could produce
evaluative conditioning effects. Next, I will point out that
a multiple-process perspective sheds new light on the existing
literature and leads to new predictions.
A Multiple-Process Perspective
Many researchers implicitly or explicitly entertain the
assumption that evaluative conditioning effects are due to
the automatic formation and updating of associative links
between representations. Take the example of the “have-
a-Coke-and-a-smile” ads. Because the Coke brand is paired
with images of smiling people, it is assumed that the
representation of the Coke brand in memory will become
associated with the representation of smiling people or
with the positive affect that is evoked by these smiling
people. When people see the Coke brand after being
exposed to the ads, this will activate the representation of
smiling people or positive affect, leading to positive
feelings. Different associative models differ in their
assumptions about the type of representations that are
associated (e.g., stimulus or response representations), the
rules that govern the formation of associations (e.g.,
spatiotemporal contiguity or reduction of prediction error),
and the conditions under which associations influence
behavior (e.g., direct translation or comparison of different
associations). But all are based on the idea that conditioning
effects are due to the automatic formation and updating of
associations in memory.
The dominance of associative models in research on
evaluative conditioning is not surprising given that such models
have always been prominent in conditioning research. However,
there is no a priori reason why evaluative conditioning effects
can be due only to association formation. Evaluative
conditioning effects are by definition associative in nature (i.e.,
due to the procedure of the pairing of stimuli) but they are
not necessarily due to the automatic formation of associations
in memory. For instance, De Houwer and colleagues (De
Houwer, Baeyens, et al., 2005) pointed out that people might
intentionally use conscious propositional knowledge about
contingencies between stimuli as a basis for their evaluation
of those stimuli. Assume that you receive an electric shock
every time you see a picture of a triangle but never after seeing
a picture of a circle. Afterwards you are asked to indicate how
much you like the triangle and how much you like the circle.
Probably you will say that you like the triangle less than the
circle. When asked why, you can point to the fact that the
triangle signals the shock as a justifiable reason for disliking
the triangle. In this case, the change in liking is due to the
pairing of the triangle and the shock (i.e., it is an evaluative
conditioning effect) but it is not produced by automatic
associative processes. Rather, it is a genuine change in liking
that is based on the fact that you have acquired conscious
propositional knowledge about the relation between the triangle
and the shock and that you have used this knowledge as a
basis for evaluating the triangle. Note that these changes are
not due to demand compliance. Demand compliance also
entails that participants have conscious propositional knowledge
about the stimulus contingencies, but in the case of demand
compliance, participants use this knowledge because they
believe that this is what the experimenter wants them to do.
Both types of effect thus depend on the use of propositional
knowledge about stimulus contingencies, but the knowledge
is used for different reasons (i.e., to arrive at a genuine
evaluation of the stimuli versus to comply with the expectations
of the experimenter; see Meersmans, De Houwer, Baeyens,
Randell, & Eelen, 2005). Whereas associations in memory
merely encode that events or concepts are related, propositions
also specify the type of relation (e.g., “is a”) and thus imply
a truth value (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). It is also assumed that
associations in memory can be formed and activated
automatically whereas propositions can be formed and activated
only in a controlled, non-automatic manner (e.g., Strack &
Deutsch, 2004).4
4 There are probably still other processes that could underlie evaluative conditioning effects. For instance, Davey (1994) argued that
pairing stimuli makes salient the features that these stimuli have in common. When pairing a neutral stimulus with a liked stimulus, this
could make salient the liked features of the neutral stimulus and thus lead to an increase in the liking of the originally neutral stimulus
(and vice versa for a neutral stimulus paired with a disliked stimulus). According to this explanation, evaluative conditioning is due to
the pairing of stimuli but not to the formation of associations. Instead, evaluative conditioning is assumed to be based on a change in
the representation of the conditioned stimuli.
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A Possible Explanation for Conflicting Results in the
Literature
At the beginning of this paper, I noted that there are
many conflicting data about the conditions under which
evaluative conditioning effects can be observed. These
concern both conditions related to the core procedure of
evaluative conditioning as well as enabling conditions. For
instance, whereas some studies found evidence for
extinction, others showed that evaluative conditioning
effects are unaffected by CS-only presentations after the
CS-US pairings (see Diaz et al., 2005 vs Lipp & Purkis,
2006, for recent conflicting evidence). Likewise, whereas
some studies found that evaluative conditioning depends
on awareness of the CS-US contingencies, others found
no link between evaluative conditioning and contingency
awareness (see Dickinson & Brown, 2007, and Walter &
Nagengast, 2006, vs. Pleyers et al., 2007, for recent
conflicting evidence).
One way to explain this puzzling mixture of results is
to assume that different evaluative conditioning effects
can be due to different processes. For instance, the
formation of conscious propositional knowledge about
contingencies by definition implies awareness of the
contingencies. Also, such knowledge is likely to reflect
changes in contingencies such as those that occur during
an extinction procedure. Hence, evaluative conditioning
effects that are due to the use of conscious propositional
knowledge about contingencies should depend on
contingency awareness and be sensitive to extinction. It
is often assumed, on the other hand, that the automatic
formation of associations occurs independently of
contingency awareness and reflects only the spatiotemporal
contiguity between stimuli rather than the statistical
contingency (e.g., Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995;
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Walther et al., 2005).
Therefore, in studies where evaluative conditioning effects
are based on the automatic formation of associations,
effects might well occur independently of contingency
awareness and be unaffected by extinction5. 
Implications for Future Research
Although this explanation of past conflicting results is
post-hoc, it does lead to interesting new predictions. Most
importantly, it can be predicted that the impact of certain
enabling conditions will tend to covary with the impact of
certain core procedural conditions. For instance, from the
previous paragraph, it can be inferred that evaluative
conditioning effects that do not depend on contingency
awareness should also be resistant to extinction. The reverse
should also hold (i.e., evaluative conditioning that does
depend on contingency awareness should show extinction).
To the best of my knowledge, these predictions have not yet
been tested in the literature. The reason probably is that
researchers have until now regarded evaluative conditioning
as a unitary phenomenon that relies on one type of processes.
Based on this view, the purpose of research becomes to
elucidate the conditions under which evaluative conditioning
occurs and to clarify the processes that underlie evaluative
conditioning effects. From the viewpoint that two or more
processes can produce evaluative conditioning effects,
research should clarify not only whether but also when certain
conditions are necessary to observe evaluative conditioning
effects and when certain processes are important. The aim
is thus to find the conditions under which certain conditions
are important. In other words, the multiple process view
implies a meta-conditional approach that attempts to identify
clusters of conditions that tend to co-occur.
Until now, I have limited the discussion to the enabling
condition of contingency awareness and the core procedural
condition of extinction. More generally, one can predict that
non-automatic evaluative conditioning effects should reflect
the statistical contingency between the CS and US whereas
automatic evaluative conditioning effects should reflect
spatiotemporal contiguity6. This prediction is derived from
the following assumptions. First, propositional processes are
non-automatic and thus can produce evaluative conditioning
effects only when participants are aware of the contingencies,
have time and resources to form and use propositions, and
have control over the formation and use of propositions (but
5 I do not exclude the possibility that evaluative conditioning effects are based exclusively on the operation of propositional processes
(see De Houwer, Vandorpe, & Beckers, 2005). In that case, evidence for evaluative conditioning effects that are resistant to extinction
and independent of contingency awareness might indeed result from methodological problems. However, at present, it is too early to
exclude the possibility that the automatic formation of associations might be important in some instances of (evaluative) conditioning.
6 Although I would discourage researchers from defining evaluative conditioning in terms of a theoretical process, it would be possible
in principle to define it in terms of enabling conditions. For instance, one could argue that only automatic evaluative conditioning is “true”
evaluative conditioning. Such a definition would imply not only that changes in liking are attributed to the pairing of stimuli but also that
this effect occurred under a certain set of enabling conditions (e.g., that participants were not aware of the contingencies). A definition in
terms of enabling conditions is more complex than a definition in terms of core procedure only, but in principle, it should be possible to
verify such a definition empirically. Also, it does not completely restrict ideas about possible underlying processes. It does restrict, by
definition, research with regard to the enabling conditions that are necessary for evaluative conditioning. If one chooses to restrict attention
to automatic evaluative conditioning, this should be made explicit. One should be also aware of the limitations that this implies.
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see Moors & De Houwer, 2006b). Second, under optimal
conditions, conscious propositional knowledge about
contingencies reflects the actual statistical contingency
between the CS and US (e.g., Shanks, 1995). Third,
association formation is automatic and can thus produce
evaluative conditioning effects even when participants are
unaware of the contingencies, do not have time or resources
to engage in effortful processing, and do not have control
over the formation and use of associations. Fourth,
associations are assumed to reflect the spatiotemporal
contiguity between the CS and US. Note that a strong
version of this logic also implies that the presence of one
enabling condition can determine the role of another enabling
condition. For instance, when participants do not have time
or resources to use propositions, the observed effects would
not depend on contingency awareness. This follows from
the assumption that different enabling conditions are related
(but see Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2006b).
Although the meta-conditional approach will help elevate
conditioning research beyond the current boundaries, it will
not make research easier. There are several potential pitfalls
that should be taken into consideration. First, past research
has shown that it is not easy to establish whether a certain
condition is important for observing evaluative conditioning
effects. For instance, hundreds of pages of text have been
devoted to how one should establish whether (evaluative)
conditioning depends on contingency awareness (e.g., Shanks
& St. John, 1994). Likewise, there have been debates about
how to establish whether evaluative conditioning defies
extinction (e.g., Lipp et al., 2003). The meta-conditional
approach proposed in this paper implies that one establishes
the impact of not just one but two or more conditions
simultaneously (e.g., not only whether evaluative
conditioning depends on contingency awareness but also
whether extinction has occurred) and establishes a relation
between the impact of those conditions. Fortunately, a lot
has been learned in the past decades about how to establish
whether enabling or core procedural conditions are important.
Moreover, the emphasis is not on how to establish that a
certain condition is crucial but on whether the impact of
different conditions is related. For instance, if one can
consistently observe that extinction occurs when evaluative
conditioning depends on contingency awareness but not
when evaluative conditioning is independent of contingency
awareness, this would be a valuable observation regardless
of whether one agrees that the criterion for establishing the
effect of extinction or the role of contingency awareness is
the ultimate criterion. If one can observe such a systematic
link between the effect of different conditions, this could
actually be taken as evidence for the validity of the criteria
that were used to establish the impact of the conditions.
A second potential pitfall of the meta-conditional approach
is that specific predictions about clusters of conditions depend
on multiple, often ill specified theoretical assumptions. The
value of (the predictions of) the approach thus depends on
the validity and specificity of the theoretical assumptions. For
instance, it is often assumed that associative knowledge can
be expressed automatically whereas propositional knowledge
can influence behavior only in an intentional, controlled
manner (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack &
Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, one way to exclude an impact of
propositional knowledge on evaluative conditioning is to use
measures of liking that cannot be controlled. Recently
developed implicit attitude measures such as affective priming
effects and the Implicit Association Test (IAT) effects are
typically considered to provide such an uncontrollable measure
of liking (e.g., Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2003; Mitchell,
Anderson, & Lovibond, 2003; but see De Houwer, 2006a,
2006b). Research has shown, however, that propositional
knowledge can influence at least one popular implicit attitude
measure, namely IAT effects (De Houwer, 2006b; De Houwer,
Beckers, & Moors, in press). This demonstrates that the IAT
does not provide a failsafe method for excluding the impact
of propositional processes. If future research shows that other
implicit measures are also influenced by propositional
knowledge, this might even indicate that propositional
knowledge can influence behavior in an automatic manner.
This example illustrates that one should always be aware that
theoretical assumptions underlying (meta-conditional) research
might well be invalid. Such assumptions thus need to be tested
empirically.
Summary and Conclusions
Humans and other organisms tend to want, do, and buy
more often the things they like than the things they do not
like. To understand and control human behavior, it is
therefore imperative that we understand how likes and
dislikes are acquired. Evaluative conditioning research has
shown that the preference for a stimulus can be influenced
by pairing that stimulus with another stimulus. Understanding
evaluative conditioning can thus provide many insights in
human behavior. Unfortunately, we still do not know much
about this important phenomenon. To make matters worse,
the current literature on evaluative conditioning contains
many conflicting results that have not been reconciled in a
satisfactory manner.
In the present paper, I have argued that progress in our
understanding of evaluative conditioning is hampered by
confusion regarding the meaning of the concept “evaluative
conditioning”. It can be used to refer to a procedure (i.e.,
pairing stimuli and checking whether this produces changes
in liking), an effect (i.e., an actual change in liking as the
result of pairing stimuli), or a theoretical process (i.e., the
process by which pairing stimuli results in changes in liking).
Problems arise when evaluative conditioning is defined in
terms of a particular process. Not only is it difficult to
determine whether a particular change in liking is due to a
particular process (and thus to determine whether evaluative
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conditioning has occurred), such a view also tends to narrow
theoretical thinking about evaluative conditioning in general.
Most importantly, it detracts attention from the possibility
that several processes can be responsible for evaluative
conditioning effects, that is, for a change in liking that is
due to the pairing of stimuli. It is therefore advisable to
define evaluative conditioning in terms of an effect and to
allow for the possibility that such effects can be due to at
least two types of processes: the automatic formation of
associations in memory and the non-automatic use of
propositional knowledge about stimulus contingencies. The
conflicting results that have been reported in the literature
could have been due to the fact that the observed
conditioning effects were in some cases due to one process
and in other cases due to the other process. This multiple
process view leads to a meta-conditional approach in which
the aim of research is to examine not only which conditions
are necessary for evaluative conditioning but also when
these conditions are relevant. Although one should be aware
of potential pitfalls of this meta-conditional approach, it is
my firm belief that this approach is the best way to move
evaluative conditioning research forward.
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